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NOTE
Regulating Electricity-Market Manipulation:
A Proposal for a New Regulatory Regime to
Proscribe All Forms of Manipulation
Matthew Evans*
Congress broadly authorized the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC”) to protect consumers of electricity from all forms of manipulation in
the electricity markets, but the regulations that FERC passed are not nearly so
expansive. As written, FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule covers only instances
of manipulation involving fraud. This narrow scope is problematic, however,
because electricity markets can also be manipulated by nonfraudulent activity.
Thus, in order to reach all forms of manipulation, FERC is forced to interpret
and apply its Anti-Manipulation Rule in ways that strain the plain language
and accepted understanding of the rule and therefore constitute an improper
extension of the fraud-based regulations to nonfraudulent activity. This Note
argues that FERC ought to fix the current anti-manipulation regulatory re-
gime, both as a matter of sound governmental regulation and to ensure fair
notice to the regulated entities. In particular, this Note contends that FERC
should redraft its Anti-Manipulation Rule and that, in doing so, it should use
the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”)’s rules as a model. By
adopting the CFTC’s rules, FERC could design a new anti-manipulation regu-
lation that would properly and flexibly encompass all forms of potential ma-
nipulation in the electricity markets—a solution that would allow the law
adequately to respond to future attempts at manipulation.
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Introduction
In the summer of 2013, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission
(“FERC” or “Commission”) concluded two of the largest investigations in its
history. These investigations, which examined potential electricity-market
manipulation by Barclays and JP Morgan, resulted in $720 million in penal-
ties, $159.9 million in disgorged profits, and $18 million in penalties im-
posed against individual traders.1 Shortly thereafter, FERC launched another
investigation, this time against BP America, seeking $28 million in civil pen-
alties and $800,000 in disgorged profits.2 Such aggressive actions to regulate
electricity-market manipulation indicate that FERC’s enforcement efforts
are likely to continue.3 This trend has made the Commission’s regulatory
scheme a significant issue, both for regulated entities and for those who use
and benefit from well-functioning, reliable electricity markets.
FERC is an independent agency charged with, among other things, reg-
ulating the interstate transmission4 of electricity.5 In 1920 Congress created
the Federal Power Commission—the predecessor agency to FERC—to
coordinate federal control of hydroelectric projects,6 and FERC has seen its
1. Brian Heslin, FERC Investigations into Electricity Market Manipulation Make an Im-
pression with Record Penalties Imposed on Companies and Individuals, MVA L. Blogs (Aug. 9,
2013), http://blogs.mvalaw.com/blog/2013/08/09/ferc-investigations-into-energy-market-ma-
nipulation-make-an-impression-with-record-penalties-imposed-on-companies-and-
individuals.
2. Id.; BP Am. Inc., 144 FERC ¶ 61,100, para. 1 (2013) (discussing alleged violations of
18 C.F.R § 1c.1 (2012) and 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2012)).
3. For a brief overview of FERC’s increased enforcement activity, see Heslin, supra note
1.
4. All sales of wholesale electricity are understood to be interstate because the transmis-
sion grid crosses state boundaries, except for in the majority of Texas. Most of that state’s
transmission system remains within state borders and therefore qualifies as intrastate. Electric-
ity Primer—The Basics of Power and Competitive Markets: What Is a Wholesale Electricity Mar-
ket?, Electric Power Supply Ass’n, http://www.epsa.org/industry/primer/?fa=wholesale
market (last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
5. What FERC Does, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-
does.asp (last updated June 24, 2014).
6. History of FERC, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, http://ferc.gov/students/ferc/his-
tory.asp (last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
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congressionally delegated authority significantly expanded ever since.7 The
most recent example is the Energy Policy Act of 2005, which gave FERC new
tools to prevent and penalize the manipulation of electricity markets,8 as
well as bestowed on the Commission considerably more authority and re-
sponsibility.  FERC’s expanded authority includes the ability to impose civil
penalties of up to $1 million per day for each violation of the anti-manipula-
tion regulations.9 FERC’s Office of Enforcement is the agency branch most
heavily involved in regulating electricity-market manipulation.10 The Obama
Administration has increased the office’s budget by almost 50 percent and
has also increased its staff, which now includes experienced criminal investi-
gators and specialists charged with detecting manipulation.11
Defining and characterizing manipulation can be an exceedingly diffi-
cult task: the term manipulation has traditionally been used “imprecisely
and indiscriminately.”12 At one time or another, issues such as blameworthi-
ness, artificiality, speculation, and collusion have all served as the touchstone
of manipulation.13 FERC promulgated its Anti-Manipulation Rule pursuant
to the Energy Policy Act, and it used the Securities and Exchange Commis-
sion (“SEC”)’s own Anti-Manipulation Rule as a model.14 Although Con-
gress granted FERC broad authority to proscribe all forms of manipulation,
the rule is crafted specifically to proscribe only fraudulent manipulations.15
By prohibiting this activity, FERC sought to protect consumers from
unfairly high electricity prices by ensuring that all rates are “just and
7. For a more extensive overview of FERC’s history, see id.
8. Id.
9. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1284, 119 Stat. 594, 980–81 (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. § 825o-1 (2012)). For a helpful survey of FERC’s increased authority, see
Joseph T. Kelliher & Maria Farinella, The Changing Landscape of Federal Energy Law, 61 Ad-
min. L. Rev. 611, 624–27 (2009).
10. For a helpful explanation of FERC’s enforcement process, see Suedeen Kelly & Julia
E. Sullivan, Navigating the FERC Enforcement Process, in Inside the Minds: Complying with
Energy and Natural Resources Regulations 7 (2014). FERC’s Office of Enforcement is
responsible for serving the “public interest by protecting consumers through market oversight
and surveillance; assuring compliance with tariffs, rules, regulations, and orders; detecting,
auditing, and investigating potential violations; and crafting appropriate remedies, including
civil penalties and other measures.” Office of Enforcement (OE), Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n,
https://www.ferc.gov/about/offices/oe.asp (last updated Aug. 6, 2014).
11. Ben Protess & Michael J. de la Merced, An Energy Regulator Vs. Wall St., N.Y. Times,
Nov. 2, 2012, at B1, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2012/11/01/ferc-takes-aim-at-
wall-street.
12. Craig Pirrong, Squeezes, Corpses, and the Anti-Manipulation Provisions of the Com-
modity Exchange Act, 17 Regulation, no. 4, 1994, at 54.
13. Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz et al., Revolution in Manipulation Law: The New CFTC Rules
and the Urgent Need for Economic and Empirical Analyses, 15 U. Pa. J. Bus. L. 357, 363 (2013).
14. Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 4,244, 4,258 (Jan. 26, 2006)
(codified at 18 C.F.R. pt. 1c); see infra Part I.
15. See infra Part II.
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reasonable.”16 Indeed, consumers foot the bill when electricity markets are
manipulated.
Understanding the basic vulnerabilities of electricity markets is key to
appreciating the weakness in FERC’s regulatory regime and the manner in
which electricity markets can be manipulated in nonfraudulent ways. In a
simplified but realistic example, the entity that creates the electricity, the
generator, does not directly deliver that electricity to consumers.17 Rather,
the generator sells the electricity on a special market by submitting bids that
specify the price, quantity, and time of generation.18 Based on their expected
demand, utilities and large consumers, such as a major industrial factory,
bid to purchase electricity on the same market,19 and then the utilities resell
that electricity to their customers.20 In most of the United States, entities
called Independent System Operators (“ISOs”) manage these wholesale elec-
tricity markets, which are subject to FERC regulation.21 The wholesale mar-
kets are complex and do not simply reflect supply and demand: they are
specially designed to handle the unique characteristics of electricity produc-
tion. Because electricity generation and consumption must be instantaneous
and because storing electricity in batteries remains impractical for large-
scale energy needs, the markets must strike a delicate balance between sup-
ply and demand in order to ensure reliable service.22 Furthermore, genera-
tors—that is, the physical power plants that produce electricity—face a
variety of physical constraints that require special treatment in order for the
generators to function properly.23
Part I of this Note examines a few schemes that have recently been sub-
ject to FERC investigations in order to show that, while the schemes are
manipulative, they cannot fairly be characterized as fraudulent. This Part
then reviews FERC’s congressionally granted authority and its current regu-
lations, finding that, although Congress gave FERC broad authority to pro-
scribe and prevent all forms of manipulation of electricity markets, the
regulations that the Commission ultimately promulgated remain insuffi-
cient. Part II outlines FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule and argues that, as a
matter of fair notice and sound governmental policy, FERC should amend
its regulations to cover nonfraudulent forms of manipulation. Finally, Part
16. Lawrence R. Greenfield, Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, An Overview of the Fed-
eral Energy Regulatory Commission and the Federal Regulation of Public Utilities
in the United States 22 (2010), available at http://www.ferc.gov/about/ferc-does/ferc101
.pdf.
17. Electricity Primer, supra note 4.
18. See, e.g., Wholesale vs. Retail Electricity, N.Y. Indep. Sys. Operator, http://www.ny-
iso.com/public/about_nyiso/understanding_the_markets/wholesale_retail/index.jsp (last vis-
ited Aug. 18, 2014) (providing an overview of the New York energy market).
19. See, e.g., id. (describing this process in the New York market).
20. See, e.g., id. (describing this process in the New York market).
21. See JP Morgan Ventures Energy Corp., 144 FERC ¶ 61,068, para. 10 (2013).
22. See Electricity Primer, supra note 4.
23. See infra note 35.
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III proposes a flexible solution that adopts as a model the Commodity Fu-
tures Trading Commission (“CFTC”)’s regulatory response to electricity-
market manipulation.
I. Nonfraudulent Manipulation Occurs in Electricity Markets
This Part explores two recent high-profile manipulation schemes in the
electricity markets and demonstrates that such markets can be manipulated
in nonfraudulent ways. In the context of securities regulation—the source of
FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule—manipulation is a term of art. In Santa Fe
Industries, Inc. v. Green, the Supreme Court stated that market manipulation
“refers generally to practices, such as wash sales, matched orders, or rigged
prices, that are intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market
activity.”24 While it is unnecessary to catalogue every form of manipulation,
general manipulation clearly does not require fraudulent—that is, decep-
tive—behavior. In the examples that follow, this Note simplifies the manip-
ulation schemes in order to articulate concisely their basic mechanisms
while preserving their most important characteristics.25
In July 2013, FERC assessed $435 million in civil damages and $34.9
million in unjust profits, plus interest, against Barclays Bank PLC (“Bar-
clays”).26 FERC claimed that, between 2006 and 2008, Barclays made money-
losing trades in electricity markets to improve its position on financial in-
struments that were tied to the markets.27 Using such complex instruments,
Barclays would effectively place a large bet on the price of electricity at some
point in the future. For example, the bank’s traders would bet millions of
dollars that the price of electricity would rise above a set price at a set time
in the future. Barclays would then make trades on the physical electricity
markets in order to inflate the price, even though the trades were often un-
profitable.28 Because these trades raised the price of electricity, Barclays
would win its derivative bet—and this huge win would essentially reimburse
the bank for its relatively small loss in the electricity market. In other words,
Barclays did not profit on the primary trade but instead profited because the
primary trade manipulated prices such that the derivatives became more
profitable.29 Through such legitimate transactions, manipulators made
24. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
25. For a more comprehensive description of these examples, see JP Morgan Ventures
Energy Corp., 144 FERC ¶ 61,068, and Barclays Bank PLC, 144 FERC ¶ 61,041 (2013).
26. Barclays Bank PLC, 144 FERC ¶ 61,041, para. 8 (assessing civil damages of millions
of dollars against Barclays employees for their actions with respect to market manipulation).
27. Id. at para 2; Mark R. Robeck & Brooksany Barrowes, Compliance and Enforcement
Report: FERC Takes Aim at Big Banks, Baker Botts (June 2013), http://www.bakerbotts.com/
file_upload/ComplianceandEnforcementReport201306-FERCTakesAimatBigBanks.htm.
28. Robeck & Barrowes, supra note 27.
29. Maxwell K. Multer, Open-Market Manipulation Under SEC Rule 10b-5 and its Ana-
logues: Inappropriate Distinctions, Judicial Disagreement and Case Study: Ferc’s Anti-Manipula-
tion Rule, 39 Sec. Reg. L.J. 97, 103–05 (2011).
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millions of dollars in the derivatives market without engaging in any
“objectively ‘bad’ or fraudulent behavior.”30
In July 2014, FERC approved a consent agreement with JP Morgan
Chase & Co. and its subsidiary JP Morgan Ventures Energy Corporation
(collectively, “JP Morgan”) that imposed a $410 million penalty.31 FERC had
investigated JP Morgan bidding strategies and found that twelve such strate-
gies violated the Anti-Manipulation Rule.32 Many of these strategies took
advantage of different accommodations in the electricity markets for the
physical constraints of power plants, a tactic that allowed the company to
reap $125 million in unjust profits.33
ISOs bid on power using various mechanisms34 that make the electricity
susceptible to strategic bidding schemes in which the cheapest bids do not
always prevail. For example, bidders can place bids that they know the ISO
will accept, even though those units of electricity are overpriced, sometimes
significantly so. A bidder like JP Morgan could then submit honest offers—
without providing false information or omitting any required informa-
tion—while still manipulating the ISO and making millions of dollars.35
30. Id. at 102.
31. JP Morgan Ventures Energy Corp., 144 FERC ¶ 61,068, paras. 3–4 (2013) (agreeing
to $285 million in civil penalties and $125 million disgorgement of unjust profits).
32. Id. at paras. 69–72.
33. Id. at para. 2; see infra note 35.
34. For further information on ISO processes, see Market & Operations, Cal. Indep. Sys.
Operator, http://www.caiso.com/market/Pages/default.aspx (last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
35. JP Morgan’s first scheme to manipulate prices involved a feature of the market called
“ramping.” Some ISOs allow generators to “self-schedule,” whereby an electricity generator
like JP Morgan (although JP Morgan is known as financial firm, a part of its investment
portfolio involves ownership of power plants that produce electricity) essentially pays the ISO
to accept the generator’s service at specific times on the Day Ahead market—that is, a market
for electricity that will be purchased the next day. Many ISOs have built-in accommodations
for the physical limitations of power plants, one of which is the accommodation for ramping
time. This arrangement requires the ISO to pay the generator whatever the generator bids
during ramping periods, a process that is subject to certain restrictions to prevent further
manipulation. JP Morgan would submit a self-schedule according to which every third hour it
would produce electricity at a cheaper-than-market rate, thereby ensuring that it would be
scheduled to produce electricity every third hour. The company would then submit a bid for
the intervening two hours at a rate three times higher than the market rate—bids that would
never be accepted but for the ramping accommodation. Therefore, the ISO would pay the
slightly lower self-scheduled price every third hour, but it would then pay very high prices in
the two ramping hours.
JP Morgan also used a different strategy that took advantage of ramping in order to
manipulate the market. On day one, the company would submit a low Day Ahead bid for the
final hours of day two. Then on day two, it would submit $999/MWh bids—the average Day
Ahead price was $30/ to $35/MWh—for the first two hours of day three. Because the ISO
assesses prices only one day at a time, it would agree to buy electricity from JP Morgan for the
final hours of day two without knowing that it would be forced, because of the accommoda-
tion for ramping, to pay high prices for the ramping hours in day three. This scheme resulted
in huge profits for JP Morgan.
Many ISOs also include accommodations for “minimum run time,” accommodations
that JP Morgan similarly used to manipulate prices. Some ISOs allow generators to submit a
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These recent examples illustrate the ways in which electricity markets
are manipulated and demonstrate that effective manipulation does not re-
quire fraud or deception. Because electricity markets are susceptible to non-
fraudulent forms of manipulation, regulations targeting electricity-market
manipulation necessarily require a more comprehensive scope in order to
adequately protect ratepayers. To regulate properly against all forms of ma-
nipulation in the electricity markets, therefore, Congress and the relevant
agencies need to create a scheme that proscribes all forms of manipulation.
Moreover, the JP Morgan and Barclays examples are unlikely to be the most
difficult cases that FERC will confront because potential manipulators are
continually creating new schemes to stay one step ahead of the regulators.
With that in mind, this Note’s proposed solution seeks to prevent litigation
challenging FERC’s approach by fixing the problem before a case is lost or a
manipulator goes unpunished.
Historically, the SEC and CFTC regulated electricity-market manipula-
tion—the SEC through its Anti-Manipulation Rule and the CFTC through
its artificial-price standard.36 This regulatory scheme was woefully
inadequate, however.37 The SEC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule, Rule 10b-5,38 was
minimum run time—the minimum amount of time a generator agrees to produce electric-
ity—and then consent to pay the generator for all the electricity produced during that time. JP
Morgan would submit a minimum run time of twenty-four hours and a low bid for the last
few hours in the Day Ahead market, thereby ensuring compensation for all twenty-four hours
of production. The company would then submit the maximum price that it could charge for
the next day—which the ISOs’ rules capped at twice the price that it would cost to produce the
electricity—and receive in turn this higher-than-market rate for those twenty-four hours.
JP Morgan utilized at least nine other similar strategies to manipulate electricity markets.
These strategies allowed the company to take unfair advantage of various features of different
ISO bidding structures. Without using false statements or deception, JP Morgan was able to
earn millions of dollars that individual ratepayers ultimately paid for in the form of higher
prices. See JP Morgan Ventures Energy Corp., 144 FERC ¶ 61,068.
36. Shaun Ledgerwood & Dan Harris, A Comparison of Anti-Manipulation Rules in U.S.
and EU Electricity and Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal for a Common Standard, 33 Energy
L.J. 1, 4 (2012). The CFTC’s artificial-price standard is an “inherently . . . complex question of
economic analysis” that primarily “relies on prices and conditions in similar or underlying
markets to determine prices of the instruments in question.” Milson C. Yu, Libor Integrity and
Holistic Domestic Enforcement, 98 Cornell L. Rev. 1271, 1288 (2013).
37. Ledgerwood & Harris, supra note 36, at 4.
38. SEC Rule 10b-5 reads as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national
securities exchange,
(a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the circum-
stances under which they were made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or would
operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or
sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2001). The SEC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule was promulgated under the
authority granted by 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012).
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limited to securities and did not include commodities or financial deriva-
tives,39 and the CFTC’s artificial-price standard contained many loopholes
concerning physical and self-regulated markets.40 Worse yet, FERC was seri-
ously constrained because it previously enjoyed only limited authority under
the Federal Power Act.41
The California energy crisis and the related Enron scandal in the early
2000s exposed the inadequacies of the existing regulatory regime and served
as a catalyst for many of the changes in electricity-market regulation.42 The
California energy crisis was a period in which electricity prices skyrocketed
and the state’s electricity system almost failed.43 The crisis nearly bankrupted
two of the state’s largest companies and frustrated deregulation of the elec-
tric industry.44 Following these events, Congress expanded FERC’s authority
to regulate manipulation in the electricity markets through Section 1283 of
the Energy Policy Act of 2005.45 The Energy Policy Act amended the Federal
Power Act and granted FERC authority to promulgate regulations prohibit-
ing manipulation in the electricity markets.46 Congress “drafted broadly to
combat manipulation in all its forms[,]”47 and it was this expansive statutory
language that authorized FERC to prohibit manipulation in the electricity
markets. Indeed, the statute expressly states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any entity . . . directly or indirectly, to use or em-
ploy, in connection with the purchase or sale of electric energy . . . any
manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance . . . in contravention of
such rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary
or appropriate in the public interest or for the protection of electric
ratepayers.48
As the text of the statute makes clear—particularly in light of the fact
that Congress was legislating on the heels of the California energy crisis—
Congress granted FERC broad authority and considerable flexibility to pro-
scribe and prosecute all forms of electricity-market manipulation.49 And yet
despite the obvious need for expansive regulations, FERC narrowly drafted
its Anti-Manipulation Rule to proscribe only fraud.
39. Ledgerwood & Harris, supra note 36, at 4.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. See Timothy P. Duane, Regulation’s Rationale: Learning from the California Energy
Crisis, 19 Yale J. on Reg. 471, 472–73 (2002); Kelliher & Farinella, supra note 9, at 627.
43. Fred Bosselman et al., Energy, Economics and the Environment 710 (3d ed.
2010).
44. Id.
45. Energy Policy Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-58, § 1283, 119 Stat. 594, 979–80 (codi-
fied at 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2012)); Multer, supra note 29, at 100.
46. Energy Policy Act § 1283.
47. Multer, supra note 29, at 100 (emphasis added).
48. Energy Policy Act § 1283.
49. Multer, supra note 29, at 98–101.
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II. FERC Has Authority to Regulate All Forms of Electricity-
Market Manipulation, but Its Current Regulations
Fail to Do So
This Part examines FERC’s congressionally granted authority over elec-
tricity-market manipulation and determines that the Commission’s current
regulations are far more limited than congressional authority would allow.
Section II.A begins with a discussion of the regulatory scheme that served as
a model for FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule. It then concludes that, con-
trary to congressional intent and practical necessity, FERC’s rule encom-
passes only fraudulent manipulation. Section II.B then argues that FERC’s
current regime amounts to bad governmental regulation and raises issues of
fair notice.
A. FERC’s Current Anti-Manipulation Rule Proscribes
Only Fraudulent Manipulation
Although Congress gave FERC authority to regulate all forms of elec-
tricity-market manipulation, FERC’s regulations take a much narrower ap-
proach and prohibit only fraudulent manipulation.50 In crafting this narrow
rule, FERC actually used as a guide SEC Rule 10b-5, the SEC’s Anti-Manipu-
lation Rule.51 Not only does the language of the two rules mirror each
other52 but FERC uses Rule 10b-5 precedent in adjudicating manipulation
cases.53 Subsection 2 of FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule, titled “Prohibition
of electric energy market manipulation,” reads in part as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any entity, directly or indirectly, in connection
with the purchase or sale of electric energy or the purchase or sale of trans-
mission services subject to the jurisdiction of the Commission,
(1) To use or employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) To make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state
a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the
50. For a more detailed criticism of FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule and its problematic
approach to electricity-market manipulation, see Doron F. Ezickson & Paul J. Pantano, Jr.,
FERC’s New Anti-Manipulation Regime for Electricity and Natural Gas Transactions: Mixing
Apples and Oranges, Futures & Derivatives L. Rep., Mar. 2006, at 1.
51. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 4,244, 4,246 (Jan. 26,
2006).
52. SEC Employment of Manipulative and Deceptive Devices, 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5
(2014) (“It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any means or
instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange, (a) To employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, (b) To make any
untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to
make the statements made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were made, not
misleading, or (c) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person, in connection with the purchase or sale of
any security.”).
53. Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 4,246; Multer, supra note
29, at 100.
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light of the circumstances under which they were made, not mislead-
ing, or
(3) To engage in any act, practice, or course of business that operates
or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any entity.54
SEC Rule 10b-5 is a fraud-based provision, which is appropriate for reg-
ulating securities. One of the main premises of securities regulation in the
United States is that a fair and efficient securities market requires that accu-
rate information be available to all investors.55 In fact, the primary purpose
of the Securities Act is to “ensure full and fair disclosure of the character of
securities sold.”56 Securities prices are significantly determined by the infor-
mation about the securities that is known to investors; it therefore makes
sense to emphasize fraud and deceit in regulating securities manipulation
because such conduct impairs the necessary flow of truthful information,
which facilitates accurate valuation.57 Indeed, universally accessible informa-
tion allows the free market to function most effectively. By deceiving inves-
tors about the value of a security, a manipulator can influence the price of
that security in such a way that makes it vulnerable to exploitation.58 As a
result, the SEC requires publicly traded companies to accurately disclose im-
portant information to the public.59 These requirements provide “a common
pool of knowledge for all investors to use to judge for themselves whether to
buy, sell, or hold a particular security. Only through the steady flow of
timely, comprehensive, and accurate information can people make sound
investment decisions.”60 There are other methods that can be used to manip-
ulate securities markets—methods such as wash transactions or matched
orders elevate perceived trading volume and thus artificially alter the securi-
ties’ valuations—and these methods are regulated under Section 9 of the
Securities Exchange Act.61 In its efforts to regulate electricity-market manip-
ulation, however, FERC has not adopted any regulations similar to Section 9.
This type of information-based regulation proves insufficient to pro-
hibit all forms of manipulation in the electricity markets. As the examples
above demonstrate, manipulators can identify flaws in the markets’ designs
and turn those flaws into profits.62 Entities are able to manipulate effectively
54. 18 C.F.R. § 1c.2(a).
55. The Investor’s Advocate: How the SEC Protects Investors, Maintains Market Integrity,
and Facilitates Capital Formation, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, http://www.sec.gov/about/
whatwedo.shtml (last visited Aug. 18, 2014).
56. Tom C.W. Lin, A Behavioral Framework for Securities Risk, 34 Seattle U. L. Rev.
325, 330 (2011) (quoting Creswell-Keith, Inc. v. Willingham, 264 F.2d 76, 81 (8th Cir. 1989))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
57. Craig Pirrong, Electricity Market Manipulation: Definition, Diagnosis and Deterrence,
31 Energy L.J. 1, 11 (2010).
58. Id.
59. The Investor’s Advocate, supra note 55.
60. Id.
61. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. 73-291, § 9, 48 Stat. 881, 889 (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2012)).
62. See supra Part I.
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the electricity markets without ever making a knowing misrepresentation of
a material fact or concealing a material fact. Although the names of both the
SEC’s and FERC’s anti-manipulation regulations suggest a focus on manipu-
lation, the word “manipulate,” or derivations of it, appears only in the titles,
not in the regulations themselves.63 And the SEC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule
proscribes only fraud.64 The rule does not speak to nonfraudulent behavior,
and “the closest [it] comes to [regulating such actions] is to make it unlaw-
ful to engage in any act, practice or course of business that operates as a
fraud.”65
FERC considered expanding the SEC’s rule but ultimately decided
against it.66 During the rulemaking process, parties filed comments specifi-
cally identifying “the inconsistency between securities law concepts and the
operation of energy commodity trading markets.”67 At the request of some
commenters, FERC considered the potential for nonfraudulent manipula-
tions in the energy markets68 but chose not to adopt more expansive regula-
tions.69 FERC’s reasoning in this instance misses the mark—the issue is not
whether electricity markets, like securities markets, can be manipulated
through fraud (they can be) but rather whether fraud is the exclusive
method of manipulating markets. FERC’s response suggests only that using
SEC Rule 10b-5 or another fraud-based rule is necessary, not that it is
sufficient.
Along with importing the exact language of SEC Rule 10b-5, FERC also
adopted SEC precedent relating to the rule, though FERC maintained that it
would flexibly apply such precedent.70 This decision was based on the idea
that SEC anti-manipulation case law would provide “a level of substantial
certainty” and clarify how the new regulations would operate.71 Importantly,
FERC’s decision to adopt Rule 10b-5 precedent means that FERC has given
63. The titles of both agencies’ relevant statutes indicate that they prohibit market ma-
nipulation. 15 U.S.C. § 717c-1 (2012) (SEC); 16 U.S.C. § 824v (2012) (FERC).
64. See Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 234–35 (1980).
65. Steve Thel, Regulation of Manipulation Under Section 10(b): Security Prices and the
Text of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 1988 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 359, 382.
66. See Theodore A. Gebhard & James F. Mongoven, Prohibiting Fraud and Deception in
Wholesale Petroleum Markets: The New Federal Trade Commission Market Manipulation Rule,
31 Energy L.J. 125, 131 (2010). For FERC’s final rule and responses to comments, see Prohi-
bition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. 4,244 (Jan. 26, 2006).
67. Ezickson & Pantano, supra note 50, at 1.
68. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 4,250; Gebhard &
Mongoven, supra note 66, at 131.
69. See Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 4,250; Gebhard &
Mongoven, supra note 66, at 131.
70. Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 4,250. As a matter of
administrative law, there is no doctrine of stare decisis. Charles H. Koch, Jr., Policymaking by
the Administrative Judiciary, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 693, 703–04 (2005) (describing the scope and
effect of administrative case law).
71. Prohibition of Energy Market Manipulation, 71 Fed. Reg. at 4,250 (FERC did clarify
that some of its regulations would not properly translate to electricity-market regulation but
omitted any discussion of nonfraudulent manipulations).
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precedential value to decisions that have the limited scope of “fraud.” Begin-
ning with Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder in 1976, the Supreme Court has nar-
rowed the scope of Rule 10b-5 by requiring intent.72 Moreover, as previously
mentioned, the Santa Fe Court limited Rule 10b-5’s applicability to practices
“intended to mislead investors by artificially affecting market activity.”73 The
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence makes clear that a violation of the SEC’s
Anti-Manipulation Rule requires actions intended to mislead. In this con-
text, courts have widely followed the requirement that behavior must be
deceptive in order to qualify as manipulation.74
FERC’s decision to adopt SEC Rule 10b-5 precedent supports the con-
clusion that the Commission’s Anti-Manipulation Rule proscribes only a
specific type of manipulation—manipulation that entails an act of fraud. In
cases involving securities manipulation, regulators have other means of
preventing harmful manipulative conduct, such as Section 9 of the Securities
Exchange Act.75 FERC, by contrast, has not passed an analogous regulation,
a failure that critically undermines its ability to prevent electricity-market
manipulation.
B. FERC’s Underinclusive Anti-Manipulation Rule Is Problematic
Electricity markets are materially different from securities markets, and
securities regulation is therefore an unsuitable model for electricity-market
regulation. In the United States, securities regulation aims to create a fair
and efficient securities market through ensuring the availability of accurate
information to all investors. The goal is not to protect an investor who has
accurate and sufficient information from making an unwise investment but
rather to ensure that the investor has access to the information necessary to
make the decision: “The main goal of the securities laws is to provide suffi-
cient disclosure to enable investors to make informed decisions about the
securities they buy and sell.”76 Electricity markets are different. In purchas-
ing electricity, the consumer doesn’t actively participate in the market in
order to choose the power plant from which it will buy electricity; rather,
that choice is made by ISOs, which pass the costs on to the consumer.77
72. Ernst & Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 193 (1976) (imposing the requirement of
intent in order to find a violation of SEC Rule 10b-5).
73. Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 476 (1977).
74. See, e.g., In re Olympia Brewing Co. Sec. Litig., 613 F. Supp. 1286 (N.D. Ill. 1985);
Jordan v. Global Natural Res., Inc., 564 F. Supp. 59, 65 (S.D. Ohio 1983); Wolgin v. Magic
Marker Corp., 82 F.R.D. 168 (E.D. Pa. 1979).
75. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 9, 48 Stat. 881, 889 (codified
as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 78i (2012)).
76. Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward
a More Substantive Approach to Securities Regulation, 58 Baylor L. Rev. 139, 145 (2006).
“[T]he explicitly stated goal of the [Sarbanes–Oxley] Act was not to substantively regulate
corporate behavior, but ‘to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of cor-
porate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws . . . .’ ” Id. at 143 (quoting
Sarbanes–Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, pmbl., 116 Stat. 745).
77. See supra Part I.
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Regulating electricity markets is therefore necessary in order to ensure that
the ISOs are functioning properly and are free of manipulation. Because of
the current regime’s failure to proscribe nonfraudulent manipulations,
FERC’s enforcement efforts raise fair-notice issues and pose substantial diffi-
culties for both regulated entities and for FERC’s Office of Enforcement.
Simply applying Rule 10b-5 to the electricity context cannot fully pro-
tect the markets and ratepayers because electricity markets are susceptible to
forms of manipulation that do not implicate fraud.78 This exposure to
broader forms of manipulation stems from the nature of modern trading,
electricity markets, and derivatives.79 Because electricity markets are more
vulnerable to manipulation, then, FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule proves
misguided and ill-suited to protecting electricity markets from all the forms
of manipulation to which they are susceptible.80
FERC’s attempts to regulate nonfraudulent manipulative conduct “re-
quire extreme logical contortions to fit the square [manipulation] peg into
the round fraud and deceit hole.”81 FERC’s current approach constitutes a
form of bad governmental regulation. While sound regulatory practices cre-
ate reasonably clear boundaries and punish those who cross the boundaries,
FERC’s approach provides hazy guidance to regulated entities, thereby mak-
ing it difficult for businesses to plan their affairs and act accordingly. When
regulations are universally understood and reliably enforced, the regulated
entities are more likely to comply voluntarily—a more efficient outcome
than enforcement actions, and an outcome that mitigates any perceived in-
justice or capriciousness.82 FERC’s approach is especially problematic for its
Office of Enforcement, which lacks clear instructions from the Commission
about which types of behavior merit the agency’s time and resources. This
regime also invites after-the-fact challenges to the rule, a process that can be
resource intensive for FERC, the regulated entity, and the already
overburdened judiciary.83
Given its deficient regulatory practices, FERC’s enforcement activity is
also susceptible to legal challenges based on the fair-notice doctrine in ad-
ministrative law.84 In the context of civil regulation, “the fair notice doctrine
78. Robeck & Barrowes, supra note 27 (stating that “FERC’s new manipulation provision
uses the language of 10b-5 and the FERC has said that it will consider SEC precedent for
enforcement of 10b-5, but the concepts are not easily transferable”).
79. See Multer, supra note 29, at 99–101; Pirrong, supra note 57, at 1.
80. Pirrong, supra note 57, at 2.
81. Id. at 12.
82. See Jason Nichols, Note, “Sorry! What the Regulation Really Means Is . . .”: Adminis-
trative Agencies’ Ability to Alter an Existing Regulatory Landscape Through Reinterpretation of
Rules, 80 Tex. L. Rev. 951, 953 (2002).
83. See id.
84. Although the basis for the fair-notice doctrine has not been authoritatively settled,
the doctrine plausibly sounds in both the Due Process Clause and Section 706 of the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, “which prohibits agency action that is ‘arbitrary’ and ‘capricious,’ or
otherwise not in accordance with law.” Albert C. Lin, Refining Fair Notice Doctrine: What
Notice Is Required of Civil Regulations?, 55 Baylor L. Rev. 991, 998 (2003).
598 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 113:585
provides that where application of a regulation may involve a civil penalty or
drastic sanctions, an agency must provide fair notice of its regulatory inter-
pretation to the regulated public.”85 Although the Supreme Court has yet to
decide how the fair-notice doctrine should be applied, some of the federal
courts of appeals have made this determination,86 albeit in an inconsistent
manner. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia Circuit held that the fair-notice requirement applies in any civil case
where “sanctions are drastic,”87 a requirement that is easily met when the
penalties assessed are in the hundreds of millions of dollars. The court fur-
ther held that the “ascertainable-certainty” test should be applied when ad-
judicating fair-notice claims:
If, by reviewing the regulations and other public statements issued by the
agency, a regulated party acting in good faith would be able to identify,
with “ascertainable certainty,” the standards with which the agency expects
parties to conform, then the agency has fairly notified a petitioner of the
agency’s interpretation.88
Other circuits have similarly fashioned standards for interpreting the
fair-notice doctrine. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit stated that regulations cannot be “incomprehensibly vague,”89 and
the Second, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits applied some variation of the inquiry,
focusing on whether “a reasonably prudent person, familiar with the condi-
tions the regulations are meant to address and the objectives the regulations
are meant to achieve, has fair warning of what the regulations require.”90
The unifying theme is that the regulated entity must have notice of what is
permitted and what prohibited, and it must play by the rules as promul-
gated. In other words, the regulated entity is not expected to guess or predict
whether an agency will stretch the language of its rules to proscribe other-
wise legal behavior.
To be sure, FERC is free to create and develop policy through either
adjudication or notice-and-comment rulemaking. As the Supreme Court
emphasized in one of its landmark administrative-law decisions, “the choice
made between proceeding by general rule or by individual, ad hoc litigation
is one that lies primarily in the informed discretion of the administrative
85. Id. at 994; see also Gen. Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (D.C. Cir. 1995);
Diamond Roofing Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 528 F.2d 645, 649
(5th Cir. 1976).
86. Lin, supra note 84, at 996–97.
87. Gen. Elec. Co., 53 F.3d at 1329 (citing Radio Athens, Inc. v. FCC, 401 F.2d 398, 404
(D.C. Cir. 1968)).
88. Id.
89. Tex. E. Prods. Pipeline Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 827
F.2d 46, 50 (7th Cir. 1987).
90. Lin, supra note 84, at 1009 (quoting Rock of Ages Corp. v. Sec’y of Labor, 170 F.3d
148, 156 (2d Cir. 1999)); see also Walker Stone Co. v. Sec’y of Labor, 156 F.3d 1076, 1083–84
(10th Cir. 1998); Stillwater Mining Co. v. Fed. Mine Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 142
F.3d 1179, 1182 (9th Cir. 1998).
February 2015] A Proposal to Regulate Electricity-Market Manipulation 599
agency.”91 But the freedom to decide between adjudication and rulemaking
does not grant the agency authority to hold regulated entities liable without
first giving them fair notice. The agency cannot use an adjudicative proceed-
ing to change the substance of a policy if the regulation itself does not give
the regulated entity fair notice that it could be sanctioned for its behavior.92
Under any standard of the fair-notice doctrine, it remains doubtful that
FERC’s anti-manipulation rule would properly give a regulated entity in the
electricity industry fair notice that its behavior constituted fraud—that its
action was “[a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth or concealment of a
material fact to induce another person to act.”93 After all, JP Morgan and
Barclays provided all the required information, and they did so accurately.
In light of these difficulties, FERC’s strongest argument may be that its Anti-
Manipulation Rule aims to proscribe all forms of manipulation. And yet
such a claim struggles to find support, especially given the clear language of
the Anti-Manipulation Rule and an administrative history that rejects an
expansive interpretation that would cover all forms of manipulation.94
Moreover, FERC’s current rule discusses only manipulative conduct involv-
ing the use of fraud.95 And the Commission’s decision to adopt the SEC
precedent makes its case even harder, because such a move shows (1) that
FERC intended only to regulate fraud and (2) that “fraud” should be con-
strued narrowly.96 As a result of these difficulties, entities subject to a FERC
enforcement action may plausibly offer the defense that they lacked fair no-
tice, which may result in increased litigation that would prove costly for
both FERC and the regulated entities.
FERC’s impermissible extension of its Anti-Manipulation Rule has yet
to be tested in federal court.97 Jurisprudence relating to Rule 10b-5’s reach
and FERC’s recent enforcement actions signal that FERC’s broad application
of its rule may present serious issues for the Commission. For example, in
United States v. Radley, a federal district court held that a different ana-
logue98 to the SEC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule failed to cover nonfraudulent
manipulations.99 Radley therefore suggests that federal courts may not look
favorably on agency attempts to regulate behavior falling outside the scope
of what an agency’s rules proscribe. More recently, in March 2013, the D.C.
91. SEC v. Chenery Corp. (Chenery II), 332 U.S 194, 203 (1947) (emphasis omitted).
92. See Gates & Fox Co. v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm’n, 790 F.2d 154,
156–57 (D.C. Cir. 1986) (Scalia, J.).
93. Black’s Law Dictionary 685 (8th ed. 2004).
94. See supra Section II.A.
95. See supra Section II.A.
96. See supra Section II.A.
97. Steven Mufson, Barclays to Fight Regulator’s Fine, Wash. Post, July 18, 2013, at A12,
available at http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2013-07-17/business/40633656_1_barclays-
case-u-s-court-commodity-futures-trading-commission.
98. That is, a different regulation that is based on the SEC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule.
99. United States v. Radley, 659 F. Supp. 2d 803 (S.D. Tex. 2009), aff’d, 632 F.3d 177 (5th
Cir. 2011) (analyzing 7 U.S.C. § 13(a)(2) (2012), the analogous rule at issue).
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Circuit decided Hunter v. FERC, in which the court held that FERC lacked
jurisdiction to fine a former natural-gas trader for his allegedly fraudulent
actions.100 The court determined that Hunter’s scheme operated solely
within the commodity futures market and that FERC therefore overstepped
its authority in fining him.101 In these ways, Hunter indicates that FERC’s
authority remains limited and that the federal judiciary is willing to rein in
overly aggressive enforcement efforts.102
III. FERC Should Adopt a Modified Version of the
CFTC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule
The current regulatory scheme should be modified to reflect the realities
of electricity markets: these markets are susceptible to various forms of ma-
nipulative conduct—including fraudulent behavior—which poses many
regulatory problems. This Part examines the CFTC’s primary manipulation
regulation and argues that FERC should adopt it, with modifications, in or-
der to regulate manipulation in the electricity markets. Because regulations
prohibiting fraudulent manipulative conduct are necessary but not suffi-
cient, the new rule should supplement—rather than supplant—FERC’s ex-
isting anti-manipulation rule.
A. The CFTC’s Anti-Manipulation Regime
The CFTC, which regulates markets for commodity futures, has “broad
statutory authority to prohibit and prosecute fraud, deception, price manip-
ulation, and false reporting in the commodity and associated derivative mar-
kets.”103 After the Dodd–Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act was passed in 2010, the CFTC promulgated Rules 180.1 and
180.2 to change how it regulated manipulation.104 Rule 180.1 is substantially
similar to SEC Rule 10b-5 and FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule; the only
differences are nonmaterial linguistic changes that reflect the various sub-
jects of the regulations.105 Given these similarities, adopting the CFTC’s rule
100. Hunter v. FERC, 711 F.3d 155, 157–59 (D.C. Cir. 2013).
101. Id.
102. A fair counterargument to the suggestion that FERC should modify its Anti-Manipu-
lation Rule is that FERC and the ISOs should instead fix their markets. To be sure, one could
argue that many of JP Morgan’s schemes took advantage of loopholes that were waiting to be
exploited. This Note does not argue that the current markets are designed perfectly. Market
reforms are indeed necessary, but they ultimately remain insufficient. Rather, this Note’s pro-
posal assumes that future opportunities for manipulation will inevitably arise, and it works
from that assumption in concluding that modifying FERC’s regulatory regime is prudent.
103. Multer, supra note 29, at 110.
104. See Prohibition of Market Manipulation, 75 Fed. Reg. 67,657, 67,662 (proposed Nov.
3, 2010) (codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180 (2014)).
105. See 17 C.F.R. § 180.1 (2014). The CFTC’s rule states as follows:
(a) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, in connection with any
swap, or contract of sale of any commodity in interstate commerce, or contract for future
delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity, to intentionally or recklessly:
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would largely preserve FERC’s Anti-Manipulation Rule, which could still be
used to prevent and penalize fraudulent manipulation.
The CFTC’s regime extends further than SEC Rule 10b-5, explicitly dis-
tinguishing fraud from other forms of manipulation in its Anti-Manipula-
tion and Anti-Fraud Rules.106 In particular, CFTC Rule 180.2, titled
“Prohibition on price manipulation,” reads as follows: “It shall be unlawful
for any person, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to manipulate
the price of any swap, or of any commodity in interstate commerce, or for
future delivery on or subject to the rules of any registered entity.”107 Four
elements comprise a violation: “(1) a manipulative act or omission; (2) in-
tent; (3) causation; and (4) artificial price.”108 In its rule, the CFTC further
clarified that a violation does not require fraud or otherwise illegal behav-
ior.109 Thus, if FERC were to adopt an analogue to CFTC Rule 180.2, FERC’s
regime would be expanded to cover all fraudulent manipulation (through its
current Anti-Manipulation Rule), as well as all other forms of manipulation.
Importantly, the new rule’s intent requirement ensures that only those
actors who are trying to manipulate electricity markets will be held liable.
The most crucial issues that the requirement raises concern proof. In the
absence of clear evidence of intent, such as recordings or email conversa-
tions,110 intent may be proved by circumstantial evidence. Courts have in-
ferred intent when the underlying conduct would be “uneconomic or
(1) Use or employ, or attempt to use or employ, any manipulative device, scheme, or
artifice to defraud;
(2) Make, or attempt to make, any untrue or misleading statement of a material fact
or to omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made
not untrue or misleading;
(3) Engage, or attempt to engage, in any act, practice, or course of business, which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person; or,
(4) Deliver or cause to be delivered, or attempt to deliver or cause to be delivered,
for transmission through the mails or interstate commerce, by any means of commu-
nication whatsoever, a false or misleading or inaccurate report concerning crop or
market information or conditions that affect or tend to affect the price of any com-
modity in interstate commerce, knowing, or acting in reckless disregard of the fact
that such report is false, misleading or inaccurate. Notwithstanding the foregoing, no
violation of this subsection shall exist where the person mistakenly transmits, in
good faith, false or misleading or inaccurate information to a price reporting service.
Id.
106. See id. § 180.1–.2.
107. Id. § 180.2 (emphasis added).
108. Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 13, at 369–70.
109. Prohibition of Market Manipulation, 75 Fed. Reg. 67,657, 67,661 (Nov. 3, 2010)
(codified as amended at 17 C.F.R. pt. 180 (2014)) (“The Commission . . . emphasizes . . . that
the conduct giving rise to a manipulation charge need not itself be fraudulent or otherwise
illegal.”).
110. In the wake of the Enron scandal, a huge body of evidence was found that showed
intent. Indeed, FERC made publicly available more than 500,000 emails from various Enron
employees, a trove that later became “Enron Corpus,” an online dataset used to study linguis-
tics and computer science. See John Markoff, Armies of Expensive Lawyers, Replaced by Cheaper
Software, N.Y. Times, Mar. 5, 2011, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/05/
science/05legal.html; Enron Email Dataset, Carnegie Mellon Univ., http://www.cs.cmu.edu/
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irrational, absent an effect on market price.”111 Adopting this inference in
the case of the Barclays trades, it is evident that Barclays engaged in inten-
tional market manipulation. The bank’s uneconomical trades designed to
affect prices, although not fraudulent, strongly indicate manipulative
intent.112
Previous CFTC adjudications can be used to understand how the ele-
ments of the proposed rule would play out in electricity-market regulation
and can guide FERC in adopting the CFTC’s anti-manipulation rule. The
jurisprudence tends to focus jointly on the causation and price-artificiality
elements and then addresses intent separately.113 (For its part, the artificiality
requirement essentially requires a price that does not “reflect basic forces of
supply and demand,”114 and this element is often proved by econometric
analyses of price trends and asymmetric market information, such as supply
and price increasing together.115) By looking to CFTC case law, then, FERC
can ensure that it is faithfully adopting the CFTC’s anti-manipulation rule.
B. Proposed Anti-Manipulation Language
This Note proposes that FERC, using CFTC Rule 180.2 as a model,
adopt an anti-manipulation rule to supplement its existing anti-fraud
rule.116 FERC’s new anti-manipulation rule should read as follows: “It shall
be unlawful for any entity, directly or indirectly, to manipulate or attempt to
~./enron/ (last visited Aug. 18, 2014). Statements in these emails and tapes clearly evince an
intent to manipulate energy markets and a general lack of concern for the people who were
affected. Such statements include, “I want to see what pain and heartache this is going to cause
Nevada Power Company,” and “I’m still in the mood to screw with people.” Lauren Johnston,
More Incriminating Enron Tapes, CBSNews (June 19, 2004, 1:44 PM), http://www.cbsnews
.com/news/more-incriminating-enron-tapes (internal quotation marks omitted). The state-
ments also described manipulation techniques “known within Enron as ‘Death Star,’ ‘Get
Shorty,’ ‘Ricochet’ and others.” Lauren Johnston, Former Enron Trader Pleads Guilty, CB-
SNews (June 16, 2004, 6:33 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/former-enron-trader-pleads-
guilty.
111. Wendy Collins Perdue, Manipulation of Futures Markets: Redefining the Offense, 56
Fordham L. Rev. 345, 348 (1987).
112. Other forms of circumstantial evidence used to prove motive include “profit motive;
tying up delivery and/or transportation facilities; establishment of substantial futures and cash
positions and subsequent disposition of those positions, particularly if not consonant with
ordinary commercial behavior; use of step-up orders; and payment of prices in excess of fair
market value.” Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 13, at 377 (citations omitted). But defendants
can overcome all of these forms of evidence with sufficient justification for the seemingly
irrational behavior.
113. Perdue, supra note 111, at 370.
114. Cargill, Inc. v. Hardin, 452 F.2d 1154, 1163 (8th Cir. 1971).
115. Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 13, at 370–72.
116. Another potential source for language that could be used in an anti-manipulation
provision is Section 9 of the Securities Exchange Act, “Prohibition Against Manipulation of
Security Prices.” Pub. L. No. 73-291, § 9, 48 Stat. 881, 889 (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 78i (2012)).
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manipulate the price of electric energy in interstate commerce or any finan-
cial instrument regarding electric energy.”117
FERC should model its anti-manipulation regulations on CFTC Rule
180.2 primarily because of that rule’s flexibility. Neither the Energy Policy
Act nor the Commodity Exchange Act defines manipulation, which permits
the term to encompass new forms of manipulation as they develop. As dis-
cussed above, manipulation has been and continues to be a difficult term to
define.118 Although the issue of a proper definition remains beyond the
scope of this Note, the debate itself lends support to the following maxim
that exists in manipulation regulation: “The methods and techniques of ma-
nipulation are limited only by the ingenuity of man.”119 This fundamental
notion informs many approaches to regulating manipulation and suggests
that any attempt to proscribe such conduct must include broad and flexible
language. Drafting such language would allow administrative law judges to
craft a common law for manipulation regulation.120 This is precisely why
CFTC Rule 180.2 serves as the ideal model: it provides FERC with the neces-
sary flexibility to regulate effectively while setting out a four-element test
that gives regulated entities fair notice and adequately regulates all forms of
manipulation.
Although this solution is flexible and therefore subject to change, it
largely avoids the fair-notice and governmental-regulation concerns of
FERC’s current rule. And although this rule is broader than the previous
117. This solution, although modeled on the CFTC’s rule, also resembles Section 9 of the
Securities Exchange Act, which states as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of any facility of any national securi-
ties exchange, or for any member of a national securities exchange—
(1) For the purpose of creating a false or misleading appearance of active trading in
any security other than a government security, or a false or misleading appearance
with respect to the market for any such security, (A) to effect any transaction in
such security which involves no change in the beneficial ownership thereof, or (B)
to enter an order or orders for the purchase of such security with the knowledge
that an order or orders of substantially the same size, at substantially the same time,
and at substantially the same price, for the sale of any such security, has been or will
be entered by or for the same or different parties, or (C) to enter any order or
orders for the sale of any such security with the knowledge that an order or orders
of substantially the same size, at substantially the same time, and at substantially the
same price, for the purchase of such security, has been or will be entered by or for
the same or different parties.
Id. § 9(a).
118. See supra text accompanying notes 12–16.
119. Cargill, 452 F.2d at 1163.
120. A flexible and broad understanding of manipulation does not raise the same fair-
notice concerns as a regulation that is explicitly limited to a separate subset of conduct. If
FERC were to adjust its rule as proposed, it would put the regulated entities on notice that all
forms of manipulation are proscribed, thereby avoiding a fair-notice problem. FERC’s current
anti-manipulation regime, by contrast, has limited itself to a particular set of behaviors and
therefore could not put regulated entities on notice that behavior outside of this limited subset
is proscribed.
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one, its language more accurately describes the unlawful conduct that could
warrant FERC enforcement actions. The regulated entities can fairly deduce
improper trading activities and thus will be less likely to engage in them.
Increased compliance will reduce the need for enforcement actions, benefit
ratepayers, and keep disputes out of the courts.
Regulated entities instinctively worry whenever regulations change or
expand. And yet a proper understanding of how this Note’s proposal would
actually function, including the high threshold that must be satisfied to en-
force the manipulation regulations, should mitigate regulated entities’ valid
concerns. First, FERC would need to establish manipulative intent, which is
“conceptually and doctrinally among the most demanding mental state re-
quirements anywhere in financial law.”121 Second, the evidence needed to
establish such intent often involves ambiguous public behavior that can be
difficult to link to manipulative conduct.122 Third, FERC must prove that the
regulated entity’s conduct caused an artificial price, which is a heavy bur-
den.123 Lastly, courts are often hostile to the use of statistical and economic
arguments to support manipulation claims.124 All of this is not to say that
FERC would effectively be unable to bring enforcement actions under this
new rule. This proposal seeks to strike a balance that sufficiently protects
ratepayers from manipulation while allowing participants in the market a
reasonable degree of freedom to operate. The language of the proposed reg-
ulation is sufficiently flexible to respond to changes in market manipulation,
while the doctrinal hurdles described appropriately limit FERC’s enforce-
ment ability.
Finally, regulated entities’ concerns about overregulation can be allevi-
ated by the fact that manipulation investigations are extremely resource in-
tensive125 and enforcement proceedings are generally hard to win.126 It is
therefore unlikely that FERC would have the resources to investigate and
penalize every instance of potential manipulation. Instead, the Commission
would probably focus its attention on the most obvious and detrimental
violations.
This Note’s proposed rule creates a superior regulatory regime, and
FERC should therefore adopt it. The rule critically expands the coverage of
the manipulation regulation, thereby solving the problem created by non-
fraudulent manipulative conduct; the rule gives FERC flexible enforcement
power to enable it to respond to future manipulations, an essential charac-
teristic in manipulation regulation; and the rule provides fair notice for reg-
ulated entities and imposes adequate constraints on FERC’s regulatory
power.
121. Abrantes-Metz et al., supra note 13, at 359.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Id.
125. See Jerry W. Markham, Manipulation of Commodity Futures Prices—The Unp-
rosecutable Crime, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 281, 356 (1991).
126. Pirrong, supra note 12, at 60.
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Conclusion
FERC has been authorized to protect electricity consumers from all
forms of manipulation in the electricity markets. The scope of FERC’s Anti-
Manipulation Rule is limited only to fraudulent forms of manipulation,
however, and this narrow scope poses regulatory problems because non-
fraudulent means can also be used to manipulate the electricity markets. As
written, then, FERC’s rule is insufficient. The Commission should therefore
reform and broaden its current regime, both as a matter of good govern-
mental regulation and in order to provide fair notice to the regulated enti-
ties. This Note has argued that FERC should model its new anti-
manipulation regulations after those of the CFTC, which proscribe all forms
of potential manipulation by using a flexible approach that allows the law to
respond to whatever new scheme manipulators might dream up.
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